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  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff John J. Murphy (“Murphy”) filed this suit against the Township of 
Radnor (“Radnor”) alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) and the Pennsylvania Military Affairs Act 
(“PMAA”).  Specifically, he alleged that Radnor failed to hire him for the position of 
Township Manager based on his military obligations in the United States Air Force 
Reserves.  After a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Murphy’s military 
obligations were a motivating factor in the failure to hire him but that Radnor would have 
denied Murphy employment even if it had not considered his military obligations.  The 
District Court then denied Murphy’s motion for a new trial.  Murphy appealed.  We will 
affirm.1   
I. 
 We write primarily for the parties and assume their familiarity with the facts.  In 
brief, Murphy entered the Air Force in 1997 and remained on active duty until 2002, 
when he transitioned into the active reserves.  While in the reserves, Murphy was 
required to report for reserve duty 35 days per year.  In 2009, Murphy applied for the 
position of Township Manager for Radnor.  Murphy was interviewed on July 22, 2009 by 
the Interim Township Manager John Granger (“Granger”) and four Commissioners on 
Radnor’s Board of Commissioners (collectively “the Board” or “the Commissioners”):  
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the USERRA claim pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 
4301 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The District Court had jurisdiction over the state-law 
PMAA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction over the final order and 
judgment of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Hank Mahoney, Enrique Hervada, John Fisher, and Chairman Tom Masterson 
(“Masterson”).  According to Murphy, during the interview, he was “grilled,” primarily 
by Masterson, about his reserve requirements.  App. at 198-99.  Masterson allegedly 
expressed concerns about who would do the Township Manager’s work when Murphy 
was fulfilling his reserve duties, and Granger purportedly interjected and referenced 
federal prohibitions on discrimination in employment decisions based upon an 
individual’s membership in, or obligations to, the military.  Murphy testified that on July 
27, 2009, Granger called and informed him that the Board had decided not to bring him 
back for a second interview and that a few of the Board members “had serious concerns 
about [Murphy’s] ongoing military commitment.”  App. at 205-10. 
 Granger denied ever saying this, and he and the Board members testified that 
Murphy’s military obligations were not the reason that Murphy was not selected for a 
second interview.   According to their testimony, the Commissioners believed that 
Murphy had overstated his accomplishments in his resume.  Specifically, his resume 
claimed that he had developed a plan for economic recovery in Wilkes-Barre when in 
reality he had simply implemented a plan that was developed by an outside consulting 
firm.  The Commissioners also testified that other candidates were more qualified for the 
position than Murphy.   
 Masterson—allegedly as a result of his antimilitary animus—also informed the 
other Commissioners about two additional issues relating to Murphy’s candidacy.  First, 
Masterson pointed out typographical errors in Murphy’s cover letter, but he did not do 
the same with the submissions of other candidates who were given second interviews 
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despite the existence of spelling and typographical errors in their cover letters.   Second, 
Masterson informed the Board about a voicemail he received from Murphy’s younger 
brother, Patrick Murphy, a Congressman from Pennsylvania.  Murphy’s brother’s 
voicemail stated, “This is Congressman Pat Murphy.  I am calling in support of or about 
my brother J.J. Murphy’s application to be Township Manager in Radnor.  Please call 
me.”  App. at 753.  According to some of the Commissioners, the call was troubling 
because they did not want political interference with the selection or operations of the 
Township Manager.   
 Masterson testified that, following the first round of interviews, the consensus of 
the Commissioners was that Robert Zienkowski (“Zienkowski”), Dave Kraynik 
(“Kraynik”), and Peter Miller (“Miller”) were the top candidates, and all three were 
offered second interviews.  Before his second interview, Zienkowski withdrew from the 
process because of a family illness.  After their second interviews, Kraynik and Miller 
were offered the position, but they both turned it down.  At that point, the Commissioners 
decided to offer Chris Canavan (“Canavan”) a second interview because he interviewed 
well and came with good recommendations.  Canavan was offered the position, but he 
too rejected it.  After Canavan rejected the position, Zienkowski re-entered the process 
and was ultimately offered the position, which he accepted in March 2010.   
 Murphy filed suit against Radnor alleging violations of the USERRA and the 
PMAA.  The District Court subsequently granted summary judgment to Radnor.  Murphy 
appealed, and this court reversed, reasoning that the District Court had applied the wrong 
standard under USERRA for summary judgment.  See Murphy v. Radnor Twp., 542 F. 
5 
 
App’x 173 (2013).  The matter proceeded to a six-day trial between February 24, 2014 
and March 5, 2014.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Radnor.  The jury decided 
Murphy proved “by a preponderance of the evidence that his obligation for service in the 
military was a motivating factor in Radnor Township’s decision not to hire him for the 
position of township manager,” but also found that Radnor proved “by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have denied Mr. Murphy the position of Township Manager 
even if Radnor Township had not taken Mr. Murphy’s obligation for service in the 
military into account.”  App. at 948. 
 Murphy then moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(a).  The District Court denied this motion.  Murphy filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  
II. 
A.  
 Murphy’s first issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the “cat’s paw” theory of liability under the USERRA.   
“We review the District Court’s refusal to give specific jury instructions for abuse of 
discretion, but exercise plenary review over whether the District Court gave a correct 
statement of law in its jury instructions.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 
(3d Cir. 2011).  “When a jury instruction is erroneous, a new trial is warranted unless 
such error is harmless.  An error is harmless if it is ‘highly probable’ that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment.”  Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 612 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).    
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 Both USERRA and PMAA, in pertinent part, prohibit employment discrimination 
on the basis of membership in, or the obligation to perform service in, the military.  See 
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a); 51 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7309.  Pursuant to USERRA: 
An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited . . .  
if the person’s membership, . . . or obligation for service in the uniformed 
services is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer 
can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such 
membership, . . . or obligation for service. 
 
38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1).  The analysis of a PMAA claim mirrors that of a claim under 
USERRA.  See 51 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 103.   
 The cat’s paw theory of liability under USERRA, adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), provides that “if a supervisor 
performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to 
cause an adverse action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment 
action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”  Id. at 1194 (footnotes omitted).   
Based on Staub, at trial, Murphy requested the following jury instruction: 
If a participant in the decision-making process performs [an] act motivated 
by antimilitary animus that is intended by the participant to cause an 
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the 
ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under [USERRA], 
notwithstanding that the participant did not make the ultimate employment 
decision. 
 
App. at 14.  Radnor objected to Murphy’s proposed instruction, reasoning that Staub’s 
cat’s paw theory applied where a supervisor influenced the decision making of others 
with regard to a subordinate, but here, “there wasn’t any testimony that anybody was 
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influenced” by Masterson.  App. at 828.  The District Court agreed and denied the 
requested instruction. 
 Murphy argues that Masterson, who led the interview, exhibited an antimilitary 
animus against Murphy and should be treated as a supervisor for purpose of application 
of the cat’s paw theory.  The District Court held, and Radnor argues on appeal, that 
Staub’s cat’s paw theory applies only where there is a “nonbiased decision-maker [who] 
is influenced by a biased managerial employee.”   See Tucker v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 
484 F. App’x 710, 713 (3d Cir. 2012).   Moreover, “[n]one of the Commissioners 
testified that they . . . were influenced by Masterson in the way they voted.”   Appellee’s 
Br. at 37. 
 The District Court further reasoned, and Radnor also argues on appeal, that even if 
the cat’s paw instruction should have been given to the jury, the failure to do so was 
harmless because “the cat’s paw issue was only relevant to the first question on the 
verdict sheet, i.e., whether the military obligation was a ‘motivating factor.’”  Id. at 41-
42; App. at 16-17 (quoting Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191 (“The central difficulty in this case 
is construing the phrase ‘motivating factor in the employer’s action.’”)).  The jury found 
in Murphy’s favor on this first question, and the second question, on which the jury found 
against Murphy, “does not concern what is a motivating factor.”  App. at 17.  Thus, 
Murphy could not have been prejudiced by any error. 
 We agree with the District Court that any alleged error in the failure to give the 
requested instruction was harmless.   Even assuming the failure to give the proposed 
instruction was erroneous, we conclude that it is “‘highly probable’ that the error did not 
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contribute to the judgment,” and, the error, if any, was harmless.  Harvey, 635 F.3d at 
612.   
B. 
 Murphy also appeals the District Court’s decision to permit Radnor to present the 
testimony of Miller, Kraynik, and Canavan, the three candidates who, following a second 
interview, were offered the position of Township Manager in 2009. The District Court 
concluded that the testimony of Miller, Kraynik, and Canavan was relevant and should be 
admitted.  
 We affirm the District Court’s ruling on the admission of the witnesses’ testimony 
for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court.  The admission of evidence is 
firmly rested within the judgment of the district court, and we review for abuse of 
discretion.  See Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1993).  Given the 
clear relevancy of the qualifications of the candidates and the fact that witnesses typically 
are permitted to testify as to their present employment as background information, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony over Murphy’s 
objection.   
III.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
